INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER AND
DISCIPLINARY DUE PROCESS
Eugene Gressman *
The question here concerns the judicial power to create,
augment or diminish the procedural due process entitlements
and expectations of lawyers charged with substantial violations of
rules governing professional conduct. To what extent must the
full sweep of the constitutional promises of due process be
honored in disciplinary proceedings? What is the source of the
judicial power to limit the extent of procedural process due the
accused lawyer? Can limitations be imposed simply to improve
the efficiency of the disciplinary processes and to impress the
public that more and more malefactors are being ejected from
the legal ranks?
These are neither idle nor easy questions. This is particularly so in an era when the bar is under intense pressure, both
internally and externally, to improve the moral and ethical standards of the legal profession and to upgrade the low public esteem of lawyers.' We have witnessed in the past few years a
dramatic rise in vigilant enforcement of standards of conduct.
Increasing numbers of lawyers are being subjected to disciplinary
proceedings which, not infrequently, result in disbarment or suspension from practice.2 But query: Is this vigilance in pursuing
* A.B., 1938, J.D., 1940, Univ. of Michigan. Richard J. Hughes Visiting Professor of Law, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law. William Rand Kenan Professor of Law
Emeritus, Univ. of North Carolina School of Law. Co-author, R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN, S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (6th ed. 1986).
1 The most influential of the many complaints about the bar's seeming inability
to clean up the profession by use of disciplinary proceedings was the 1970 report
by an American Bar Association special committee, headed by retired Supreme
Court Justice Tom C. Clark. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement
(1970). That report found that the situation respecting enforcement of lawyer discipline was "scandalous" and that a "substantial number of malefactors" continued
to practice law. Id. at 1-3. The report found that a significant problem in lawyer
discipline was the reluctance of lawyers and judges to report misconduct. Id. at
167. Much the same problem exists today.
2 The American Bar Association has attempted to compile the actual number of
reported disciplinary cases from each of the 51 bar jurisdictions. See STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS app. 3 (1986). The states vary in the operation of
their discipline systems and in the extent to which disciplinary orders are published. The ABA study generally covers the years 1980-84, although the statistics
of some states cover somewhat different or longer periods of time. See id. The total
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the malefactors of the bar paralleled by vigilance in applying the
basic elements of procedural due process?
From the outset, American courts have been concerned
about the due process implications of disciplinary proceedings.
The early cases, in particular, recognized that disbarment can exact a heavy toll on a lawyer, and thus the judicial disciplinary
power should be exercised with the greatest of due process care.
In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall, discussing a lower court's disciplinary authority, noted that this judicial power "is one which
ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think,
incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of
decorum, and for the respectability of the profession." '
The "great caution" that Marshall urged sprang from fear
that the judiciary might exercise its control of the bar in an arbitrary manner, in disregard of the accepted nbrms of due process.
As the Court later explained:
The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to
be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court
to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be
scrupulously guarded and maintained
4 by the court, as the
rights and dignity of the court itself.
The thrust of this early concern was that the acknowledged
power of courts to admit, discipline and disbar lawyers be exercised
with full recognition of lawyers' due process right to be free of arbitrary action. Uncontrolled discretion, it was thought, begets arbitrary results. Total, arbitrary or tyrannical power over another's
lawful pursuits is not to be vested in any person or in any tribunal in
our form of government. Nowhere was such exercise of power considered more odious than when exhibited by a court towards a
member of the bar in the course of a disciplinary proceeding.
When a lawyer is charged with misconduct in professional activnumber of cases discovered by the ABA was 2991. Id. Of that number, California
accounted for 681 disciplinary cases, or 22.8%. Other states with significant numbers of cases were Florida (347 or 11.6%), New York (243 or 8.1%), Michigan (228
or 7.6%), Texas (225 or 7.5%), Illinois (198 or 6.6%), District of Columbia (126 or
4.2%), Arizona (96 or 3.2%), Massachusetts (92 or 3.1%), Tennessee (69 or 2.3%),
and NewJersey (69 or 2.3%). Id. New Hampshire and Vermont reported no disciplinary cases in the 1980-84 period. Id. See also McPike & Harrison, The True Story
on Lawyer Discipline, 70 A.B.A.J. 92 (1984) (reporting a 73% increase in sanctions
from 1978 to 1982).
3 Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
4 Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856).
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ities, the sanction of disbarment can devastate the lawyer's reputation and career, and thus "can be regarded in no other light than as
punishment for such conduct."' As Justice Field noted, writing for
the Court in Bradley v. Fisher,6 the "punishment" of disbarment can
decree poverty to the lawyer and destitution to the lawyer's family.
And in his eloquent dissent in Ex parte Wall,7 Justice Field further
observed that when the judicial power to disbar is discretionary in
nature
there is in the hands of an unscrupulous, vindictive, or passionate judge, means of oppression and cruelty which should
not be allowed in any free government. To disbar an attorney
is to inflict upon him a punishment of the severest character.
He is admitted to the bar only after years of study. The profession may be to him the source of great emolument.... To
disbar him having such a practice is equivalent to depriving
him of his capital. It would often entail poverty upon himself,
and destitution upon his family. Surely the tremendous power
of inflicting such a punishment should never be permitted to
be exercised unless absolutely necessary to protect the court
and the public from one shown by the clearest legal 8proof to
be unfit to be a member of an honorable profession.
5 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866). In Garland, the Court,
speaking through Justice Field, voided a congressional enactment excluding from
the practice of law in federal courts those lawyers who had not taken an oath that
they had given no aid or counsel to the southern cause during the Civil War. Id. at
374-80. Such exclusion was held to be a new punishment for past conduct. Id. at
377. Moreover, since Garland (who later became the Attorney General of the
United States) had received a full presidential pardon, the Court held that he was
relieved of all punishments and penalties (including exclusion from practicing law)
stemming from his past conduct. Id. at 381.
6 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). The Court ruled in Bradley that a defective
disbarment order is a judicial act for which the judge is not liable to the attorney in
a civil action for damages. Id. at 357. The attorney in that case had threatened the
trial judge with "personal chastisement" for having insulted the attorney during the
course of the trial of John Suratt for the murder of Abraham Lincoln. Id. at 334.
Immediately after the trial terminated, the judge summarily ordered that the attorney's name be stricken from the roll. Id. Justice Field wrote that the judge erred in
not issuing any show cause order, or affording the attorney any opportunity to be
heard, before striking the attorney's name. Id. at 356-57. In holding that such a
denial of due process was not compensable by way of a civil damage action, Justice
Field commented on the devastating nature of a disbarment and on the principle
that the power to disbar should be exercised only "for the most weighty reasons,"
following notice and ample opportunity for explanation and defense. Id. at 354-55.
7 107 U.S. 265 (1882). In Wall, the Court majority, in denying mandamus,
ruled that the attorney had been accorded due process in the disbarment proceeding in the lower federal court, in that he had been given due notice and a trial and a
hearing before the federal court. Id. at 290.
8 Id. at 317-18 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field's dissent gives a dramatic
account of the facts. A lynch mob had taken "one John, otherwise unknown" from
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In more recent times the Supreme Court has echoed similar
sentiments about the penal nature of disbarment, but has done so
only sporadically. In Spevack v. Klein,9 the Court described the
"threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood," like the threat of criminal
prosecution, as a powerful instrument for compelling self-incrimination by a lawyer; the fifth amendment accordingly precludes disbarment as a sanction for invoking the privilege.' 0 The modem apogee
of equating disbarment proceedings and criminal proceedings was
reached in the 1968 ruling in In re Ruffalo." There the Court repeated once again that disbarment, though designed to protect the
public, "is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer" and that
disbarment proceedings "are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature."' 2 Accordingly, said the Court, the lawyer undergoing
disbarment proceedings is entitled to procedural due process.' 3
For the most part, disciplinary proceedings are under the control and supervision of state courts. Those courts, however, uniformly reject the United States Supreme Court's historic notion that
such proceedings are criminal in nature and effect. They even reject
the Ruffalo notion that such proceedings are of a quasi-criminal nature. Rather, state courts accept and follow the concept codified in
a Florida county jail and hanged him from a tree in front of the courthouse steps.
Id. at 292 (Field, J., dissenting). Wall, the lawyer, had not been charged with, or
found guilty of, any participation in violation of Florida law. But a federal judge,
who had seen the dangling corpse on his way to court, ordered Wall to show cause
why he should not be disbarred for having engaged in, advised and encouraged the
lynch mob. Id. at 292-93 (Field, J., dissenting). The show cause order stated that it
was grounded on ex parte, unsworn statements of unidentified persons in whom
the court had "the most implicit confidence." Id. at 292 (Field, J., dissenting). Wall
denied all the charges. Id. at 294 (Field, J., dissenting). He also asserted that the
lynching incident involved a high crime against the state, not against the court. Id.
Nor did the incident occur in the presence of the court. Id. The court overruled
these objections. Id. Thejudge, who "naturally felt great indignation at the lawless
proceedings of the mob," premised his disbarment order on the testimony of but
one witness, the court marshal. See id. at 294-95 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field
described the testimony as "uncertain, insufficient and inconclusive" in identifying
Wall as a participant or leader of the lynch mob. Id. at 295 (Field, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, the judge found such testimony sufficient to prove Wall's guilt" 'positively conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. at 295-96 (Field,J., dissenting).
Injustice Field's view, "[n]othing could more plainly illustrate the wisdom of the
rule that the accuser should not be the judge of the accusation." Id. at 295 (Field,

J., dissenting).
9 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (plurality opinion).
10 Id. at 516.

11 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
12 Id. at 550, 551 (citations omitted).
'3 Id. at 552.
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Standard 1.2 of the American Bar Association's Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings: "Lawyer discipline and
disability proceedings are sui generis, and rules of procedure for civil,
criminal, and administrative proceedings do not automatically apply."' 14 Indeed, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court still believes, as it certainly did in the days of Justice Field and as it
probably did when it decided Ruffalo, that disciplinary or disbarment
proceedings are necessarily criminal in nature and impact, with consequent due process implications. The Court has not addressed the
nature of disbarment proceedings since Ruffalo.'
Unquestionably, the rules and the procedures dealing with lawyer misconduct are more complex and sophisticated today than in
the pre-Ruffalo period. But by insisting that attorney disciplinary
proceedings are not truly criminal in nature, courts are able to avoid
some of the stricter due process requirements that have achieved
constitutional status in modern times. Thus, accused attorneys have
no constitutional right to a jury trial. There is no right to remain
silent before disciplinary tribunals. There is no requirement that
the alleged misconduct be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it being sufficient if the charges are established by "clear and convincing
14 STANDARDS

FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS

Std. 1.2

(1979). Many states follow standard 1.2 by holding that their disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, not criminal in nature, and that disciplinary sanctions are imposed not as punishment but to maintain "the integrity and purity of the bar." See,
e.g., In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 227, 358 A.2d 787, 790 (1976). The United States
Supreme Court has cited Logan for just this proposition. Middlesex Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 433 n.12 (1982).
15 Justice Brennan, concurring in Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n., 457 U.S. 423 (1982), cited Ruffalo in referring to "the quasi-criminal nature
of bar disciplinary proceedings." Id. at 438 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation
omitted). Justice Brennan relied on the quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings
as a factor that calls for "exceptional deference by the federal courts" before intruding into an ongoing state disciplinary proceeding. Id. Without referring to the
Ruffalo "quasi-criminal" language, the majority opinion in Middlesex held that the
abstention policies underlying Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), "are fully
applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are
involved." Middsex, 457 U.S. at 432 (citations omitted). The state's interest in
regulating the professional conduct of its lawyers was held to be extremely important. Id. at 434.
Injuidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), the Court held that, for Younger abstention purposes, it matters not whether proceedings leading to a finding of contempt
of court "is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal in nature.., the salient fact is
that federal-court interference with the State's contempt process is 'an offense to
the State's interest . . . likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a
criminal proceeding.'" Id. at 335-36 (citation omitted). See also Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the Younger abstention doctrine
in light of the Ruffalo characterization of disbarment proceedings as being "of a
quasi-criminal nature").
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evidence." 6
Yet there are certain due process rights that must be respected
despite the sui generis nature of disciplinary proceedings. The accused lawyer, like any other citizen, is constitutionally entitled to fair
notice of the charges. The lawyer has the right to a hearing on those
charges before an unbiased tribunal. Generally speaking, the adjudicatory and prosecutory functions within the disciplinary tribunal
must be separately performed by different persons. The lawyer has
the right to be present at the hearing and to be represented by
counsel of choice. Also possessed by the lawyer are the rights to
examine all the evidence, to confront and cross-examine all witnesses, and to testify and offer counter-evidence.' 7
The presence or absence of these various due process factors,
however, is not peculiar to lawyer disciplinary proceedings even assuming that they are non-criminal in nature. These factors are relevant in all kinds of civil proceedings where one's profession,
occupation, license, or other substantial entitlement may be at stake.
Moreover, since procedural due process is an elusive concept at
best, the Supreme Court has rejected "any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."' 8
What procedures are due depends upon the specific context and nature of the adjudication in question.
Consequently, the context in which lawyer disciplinary proceedings take place must be closely examined. Here we find a unique
due process situation. Lawyers, for due process purposes, are quite
unlike any other category of professionals or laypersons. Their
rights to procedural due process depend not only upon constitutional doctrine but also upon their status as "officers of the court"members of a profession totally subservient to the awesome inherent powers of the judiciary. Those powers are breath-taking and
pervasive in scope, "starting with admission, ending with disbar16 STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS Std. 8.40
(1979). The commentary accompanying Standard 8.40 states that the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard is higher than "preponderance of the weight of
credible evidence," yet not as stringent as "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
commentary.
17 See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968).
18 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961) (citations omitted). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) ("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960)
(" 'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its
content varies according to specific factual contexts.").
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ment, and covering everything in between."' 9
Within the broad spectrum of inherent power over the practice
of law, courts determine who can and cannot practice law, as well as
the conditions under which one may be admitted to practice. They
promulgate and then interpret and apply complex codes of behavior, which cover virtually every aspect of law practice. They establish procedures for investigating and prosecuting alleged violations
of such codes. They sit in final and de novo judgment of those attorneys found either innocent or guilty by lesser disciplinary authorities, and determine the sanction to be imposed. They often sit in
judgment of the moral and ethical character of the activities of lawyers, even those activities that are not directly related to the practice
of law. Courts also have inherent and summary power to hold lawyers in contempt for various forms of disobedience to court orders
or the dictates of courtroom decorum.
These examples of inherent power are by no means exhaustive.
Nor should it be assumed that the exercise of any aspect of inherent
power is necessarily subject to overt limitations. American courts
are fond of citing and adhering to Lord Mansfield's comment that
the purpose of the inherent judicial power to discipline is not to
punish the lawyer but to determine if the lawyer "should continue a
member of a profession which should stand free from all suspicion
..[or] whether a man whom [the courts] have formerly admitted, is
a proper person to be continued on the roll or not. '"20 But as Lord
Mansfield freely admitted, a determination that an attorney is or is
not such a "proper person" calls on the court to exercise discretion.
Once discretion gets a foothold in any kind of disciplinary process it
tends to outweigh concern for protecting procedural due process
interests.
Discretion also rears its head when courts view discipline as
something other than a means of improving the public image of
what should be an honorable profession free from all suspicion. If a
court is determined, as most are, to protect the public from bad lawyers, or to incapacitate if not punish the offending lawyer, or to deter other lawyers from committing like offenses, courts have a full
19 In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 585, 428 A.2d 1268, 1272 (1981).
Ex parte Brounsall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1385 (1778). The Florida Supreme Court
put the matter more bluntly, holding that a lawyer who had engaged in highly immoral conduct within his private family circle "well deserves" to be disbarred.
Florida Bar v. Hefty, 213 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1968). The court observed that it did
"not think the conduct of this man is such that he should be allowed to mix with the
honorable members of the profession and their families." Id.
20
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arsenal of discretionary weapons. As Professor Wolfram has acutely
noted:
[M]ost courts probably conceive of their disciplinary role as
one of discretion and creativity. The norms to be imposed are
dynamic and flexible, as is true generally of exercising discretion in the common law. For many courts, that is much the
same attitude found when they resort to the common-law
in21
herent powers to adopt and enforce the lawyer codes.
Indeed, we do find a high degree of discretion written into the
modem codes of lawyer conduct. Not only are the codes liberally
construed, unlike criminal codes, but they are liberally strewn with
such imprecise concepts as engaging in "conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice, ' 22 or conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, ' 23 or other conduct "that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,"12 a or "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. '2 5 Federal courts of appeals can
suspend or disbar their respective bar members for having been
"guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court."12 6
And many state courts have not forgotten or abandoned the old
ABA Model Code disciplinary admonition that a lawyer "should
21 C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 86 (1986).
22 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule

8.4(d) (1983) [hereinafter
DR 1-102(A)(6)

MODEL RuLEs]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
23 MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 8.4(c) (1985); MODEL CODE, supra note 22,
DR 1-102(A)(4) (1981).
24 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 1-102(A)(6) (1981). This kind of conduct is
not mentioned in the Model Rules.
25 Id. DR 1-102(A)(3).
The critical problem here is in defining "moral turpitude." Courts are hopelessly divided on that matter. The new ABA Model Rules
avoid any reference to "moral turpitude" on the theory that it has no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. By way of replacement, the Model Rules
define professional misconduct to include the commission of "a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects." MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983).
Query whether that description avoids all elements of discretion and subjectivity in
determining whether the criminal act reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to
continue the practice of law.
26 FED. R. App. P. 46(b). The Supreme Court has refused to find Rule 46(b) void
for vagueness. It has defined the "conduct unbecoming" language as "conduct
contrary to professional standards that shows an unfitness to discharge continuing
obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the administration of
justice. More specific guidance is provided by case law, applicable court rules, and

'the lore of the profession,' as embodied in codes of professional conduct." In re

Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985) (citation omitted).
See generally Comment, ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: Void for Vagueness?,
57 N.C.L. REV. 671 (1979); Note, Lawyer DisciplinaryStandards: Broad vs. Narrow Proscriptions, 65 IowA L. REV. 1386 (1980).
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avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. "27
Even the bar admission process, another instance of inherent
-judicial power in action, is laden with discretion. Every jurisdiction
in the United States, as a prerequisite for admission to practice, requires that applicants possess "good moral character." The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that this term is "unusually ambiguous... [and] can be defined in an almost unlimited number of
ways ... [to] reflect the attitudes, experiences and prejudices of the
definer."' 28 Yet the Court has authenticated the use of that elusive
standard by the equally elusive notion that "any qualification must
have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law."' 29 The Court has added the not very helpful thought
that long usage of the good moral character requirement "has given
well-defined contours to this requirement.- 3 0 That long usage
shows only that the requirement produces widely divergent results
from case to case, and from state to state.3 ' The contours of the
requirement are anything but well defined.
In sum, a determination as to whether a given individual has
displayed bad moral characteristics and whether there is a rational
connection between those characteristics and the individual's fitness
to practice law in the future compels the decisionmaker to use a
good deal of discretion, subjectivity and amateur psychology. Discretion thus becomes an active ingredient in the bar admission
process.
The courts have one final and conclusive answer to those lawyers who complain about the vagueness and the subjectivity that are
written into the professional codes of behavior. It is an answer well
expressed in Justice White's concurrence in Ruffalo: "Even when a
27 MODEL CODE,

supra note 22, Canon 9 (1981). The "appearance of impropri-

ety" standard was not repeated in the later Model Rules because it was thought to
be question-begging and possibly unconstitutionally vague. But some states, like
New Jersey, have retained the "appearance of impropriety" standard in adopting
modified versions of the Model Rules. See, e.g., N.J.RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
28

Rule 1.11 (b).

Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).
29 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). The Court
then framed the issue in the Schware case as "whether the Supreme Court of New
Mexico on the record before us could reasonably find that he [Schware] has not
shown good moral character." Id. After reviewing the record, the Court concluded
that "[t]here is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that
Schware was morally unfit to practice law." Id. at 246-47.
30 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmoid, 401 U.S. 154,
159 (1971).
31 For a comprehensive survey of the use of the "good moral character" requirement, see Rhode, Moral Characteras a ProfessionalCredential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
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disbarment standard is as unspecific as the one before us, members
of a bar can be assumed to know that certain kinds of conduct, generally condemned by responsible men, will be grounds for disbarment ...includ[ing] conduct which all responsible attorneys would
recognize as improper for a member of the profession."' - 2 Or as put
by the Iowa Supreme Court, "guidelines setting standards for members of the bar need not and cannot meet the standard of clarity
required of rules of conduct for laymen due to the training and specialized nature of the body being regulated. ' "3 3
Lawyers, in other words, are a special breed. They are highly
34
trained and responsible individuals. They are officers of the court.
They have responsibilities not only to the courts but to their clients,
to the public and to the entire system of justice. They have an innate and educated sense of what is proper and improper conduct,
perhaps acquired by some process of legal osmosis. They can read
with their trained legal eyes and therefore understand what the
Supreme Court has referred to as the "'complex code of behavior'
to which attorneys are subject," a code which somehow gives definiteness and clarity to the vague portions thereof.3 5 As a result, in
Justice Brennan's words, "Given the traditions of the legal profession and an attorney's specialized professional training, there is unquestionably some room for enforcement of standards that might be
impermissibly vague in other contexts." '36
In effect, courts have exercised their inherent power over attorneys to create a specialized society that, for due process purposes at
least, is separate from the lay society. The Supreme Court performed a similar carving-out operation with respect to the military
390 U.S. 544, 555 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280,
284 (Iowa 1979) (citations omitted).
34 As noted in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 273, 283
(1985), a lawyer is an "officer" only in the judicial or legal world; a lawyer is not an
officer of the state in any political sense.
35 In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985) (quoting In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319,
324 (1st Cir. 1973)). In In re Bithoney, the First Circuit, like the Supreme Court in
Snyder, was dealing with the asserted vagueness of the "conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar" standard embodied in Rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir. 1973). In finding
that this language gives sufficient warning of the proscribed behavior:, the First Circuit stated that "we are convinced that when placed in context, as part of a rule
directed to a discrete professional group, the terms take on definiteness and clarity.
The legal profession has developed over a considerable period of time a complex
code of behavior and it is to that code that such words as 'conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar' refer." Id.
36 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 666 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32
33
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in Parker v. Levy. 7 There the Court held that the military is quite
different from civilian society, and that the different character of the
military community, members of which are trained in military customs and obligations, justifies a lower level of due process protection.3 8 Thus a military officer cannot complain that the military
code proscriptions of "conduct unbecoming an officer or gentleman" or actions "to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces" are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, no
matter how vague or overbroad these standards might be in the context of the civilian world. Parker is frequently cited by courts in rejecting claims that certain proscriptions in the lawyers' "complex
code of behavior" are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
The lawyers' world has truly become a separate society, totally
governed by the judiciary. The unlimited scope of the inherent
power of courts to control the society of lawyers is explainable by
the fact that the judiciary, in crafting this inherent power, have acquired all the powers of government, virtually free of any legislative
or executive checks. When courts promulgate codes of conduct,
they act in a legislative capacity.3 9 When they initiate or authorize
the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, they act in
their executive enforcement capacity.4" And, obviously, when
courts sit in judgment of disciplinary charges or hear appeals from
lower court decisions in disciplinary cases, they perform a traditional adjudicative or judicial task. 4 '
In political theory, the accumulation of all such governmental
powers in the hands of any group of judges is a classic violation of
the separation of powers concept. James Madison wrote in The Fed37 417 U.S. 733 (1974).

38 See id. at 756-58.
39 Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980).
The Court determined that the Supreme Court of Virginia, in enacting disciplinary
rules, constituted a legislature and that the judges were acting in their legislative
capacity. See id. The judges accordingly were entitled to legislative immunity from
suit. Id. at 734. The Court also observed that the Virginia court, in asserting its
inherent power to regulate the bar, "is exercising the State's entire legislative
power with respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the State's legislators
for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code." Id.
40 See id. at 736. The Court also held that the Virginia judges, by virtue of their
authority to initiate proceedings against lawyers, "were proper defendants in a suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief,just as other enforcement officers and agencies
were." Id. (footnote omitted). More recently, the Court has referred to the fact
that state supreme courts possess "agency-like responsibilities over the organized
bar." Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1662 (1988) (citation omitted).
41 Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. Acting in
their judicial capacity in resolving disciplinary cases, judges are entitled to their
traditional immunity from suit. See id. at 734-35.
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eralist that "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
' 42
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
We need not and do not here charge that the courts' exercise of
inherent power to control and regulate lawyers is an exercise in tyranny, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. It is enough
to note that this inherent power is indeed composed of all governmental powers respecting the practice of law. In this context, courts
legislate. They execute. They adjudicate. We can only trust that
the courts use all these powers in a responsible fashion, eschewing
the excesses that such concentration of power makes possible.
It follows that the lawyer charged with professional misconduct
can expect and demand only that amount of procedural due process
that the courts are willing to give. Even the constitutional principles
of due process are what the courts say they are. There is no other
organ of government that can relieve lawyers of any due process
deficiencies the courts may visit upon them.
The point is not that courts have unduly limited the due process
protections afforded lawyers accused of misconduct. What is important is that the kind and amount of due process that lawyers receive
are the products of (1) the unlimited discretion that is built into the
courts' inherent power to control the legal profession, and (2) the
extent to which courts are willing to treat lawyers as a special and
separate societal class, not entitled to quite all the due process protections that other professionals and other citizens enjoy. Within
those two factors lie the answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this discussion. In other words, only the courts can determine how little or how much due process will be accorded the
lawyer undergoing disciplinary proceedings.
Because so much discretion is embedded in this inherent power
to control the legal profession, there is always the danger, as Justice
Field described it, that courts will use the power as a "means of oppression and cruelty which should not be allowed in any free government."4 Modern times have not been without examples of
seeming abuse of such inherent power.4 4 We can only hope that
42 THE FEDERAUST No. 47, at 323 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
43 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 317 (Field, J., dissenting).
44 See Pollitt, Counselfor the Unpopular Cause: The "Hazard of Being Undone," 43
N.C.L. REV. 9 (1964); Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 301 (1970). For recent instances of denials of procedural
due process in the New York disciplinary system, see Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.
Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub norm. Levin v. Gulotta, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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courts will heed the observation of a wise judge that
[t]here is no inconsistency between fair treatment of lawyers
and maintenance of the long tradition of their discipline by the
courts. There is no good reason why members of the legal
profession, who have done so much to protect the constitutional rights of others, should be deprived of justice with due
process in [disciplinary] hearings and appeals-rights available to all other professionals.4 5
Judge Weinstein's dissent in Mildner, contains a comprehensive and impressive accounting of the procedural due process rights of lawyers charged with professional
misconduct. See also In re Steinberg, 137 A.D.2d 110, 528 N.Y.S.2d 375 (App. Div.),
leave to appealdenied, 72 N.Y.2d 807, 529 N.E.2d 424, 533 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1988) (attorney disbarred without a hearing, on a charge that he had misled the bar examiners
in admitting him to the bar 18 years earlier).
45 Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 201-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J.,
dissenting).

